INTRODUCTION I
N RECENT YEARS little progress seems to have been made towards fulfilling the mandate of Principle 22 of the 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment to develop further the international law regarding liability and compensation for transnational pollution or other environmental damage.
1 There are numerous examples of recent international environmental conventions in which the only reference to the international liability of states is in the form of a virtually unchanged restatement of the formula adopted in Principle 22. 2 In some documents such as the ECE Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, even that oblique reference to the principle of states' international accountability for transnational damage was considered to be inopportune: (Vincenzo Starace, editor, 1983) .
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The Canadian Yearbook of International Law 1983 the standard formula was dropped altogether. 3 Pertinent resolutions of international or private organizations in general have made little contribution towards clarification of the exact contours of the principle of liability. 4 Other internationally relevant practice has been similarly disappointing. 5 Unquestionably, today there is in international practice at least one strong undercurrent towards less rather than more explicitness of the international legal consequences of states' failure to prevent the occurrence of transnational environmental damage;
6 the notion of a state's liability as an international legal duty to make reparation for the infliction of transnational environmental harm is progressively being de-emphasized. Noting this development, some commentators like Alexander Kiss have begun to talk of "soft responsibility," claiming that "les relations Internationales contemporaines preferent en general la negociation a la mise en oeuvre de la responsabilite Internationale." 7 The perception of a diminished relevance of the traditional concept of the international liability of states as a non-negotiable legal duty to make reparation for transnationally inflicted harm 8 may
Liability for Marine Pollution 87 also be fostered by other factors. Thus, with the increase in the creation of transnational environmental risks by private persons, detailed international liability and compensation schemes that channel liability to the private actor have been or are being put into place. 9 The circumstances in which the controlling state's 10 international liability might be invoked appears correspondingly reduced. Add to this the well-known criticism of the cumbersomeness of the diplomatic claims procedure as well as the fact that international standards for the protection of the transnational environment are progressively being codified, and the issue of state liability may seem to be of well-nigh negligible importance.
Appearances, however, are deceptive. Relegating the concept of state liability to the sidelines or side-stepping it completely is a serious mistake. For, at least insofar as accidental transnational pollution is concerned, the concept remains a cornerstone in any international legal regime for the protection of the environment.
11 Thus, without anticipating the detailed analysis which is to follow, it should be noted at the outset that the international legislative response to the fact that activities carried on by private individuals increasingly pose significant hazards for the marine environment, has not rendered moot the issue of state liability. As states have deemed it necessary to extend control over these land-based, offshore, or shipping activities, state involvement has grown commensurately with the increase in the scope and frequency of potentially rule of state responsibility, i.e., the consequence of a breach of an international obligation and the notion of liability as a primary obligation contingent upon the occurrence of certain transnational damage (the notion of guarantee proper). As to the notion of liability as a "secondary rule of state responsibility," see, e.g., Report of the ILC on the Work of Its Twentyseventh Session, U.N. Doc. A/ IOOIO 16, para. 35 (1975) . As to liability in the sense of a primary obligation, see Quentin-Baxter, Preliminary Report on International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising Out of Acts not Prohibited by International Law, U.N. Doc. A/CN. 4/334, 6-7, para. 12 (1980) . 9 For details, see infra notes 79-83. 10 I.e., the state in whose territory or under whose jurisdiction the injurious activity is carried on. For further discussion of the notion, see text infra at n. 100. 11 To this effect, see also Dupuy and Smets, "Compensation for Damage Due to Transfrontier Pollution," in OECD, Compensation for Pollution Damage 181, at aoi (1981) ; and cf. Gotlieb, "The Impact of Technology on the Development of Contemporary International Law," 170 Recueil des Cours 115, at 217 (1981) .
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The Canadian Yearbook of International Law 1983 injurious private sector activities. 12 State involvement, in turn, bears directly on the prevention of the realization of the transnational pollution risk. 13 If prevention is indeed to be considered the "best environmental policy," as Kiss correctly suggests, 14 the concept of state liability, rather than being subject to easy dismissal as an ineffective incentive, 15 would have to be emphasized as a key element in the prevention of accidental transnational environmental harm.
By the same token the discernible trend towards internationally negotiated allocation of transnational losses has to be recognized as an undesirable development. It should not be accepted with equanimity, let alone be specifically promoted. For if any reasonable internalization of the costs of the transnationally hazardous activity is to be achieved between victim and polluting states, insistence on state liability as a legal concept with a non-negotiable basic content is essential. Internalization of costs is, of course, a precondition for avoidance of a distortion of the conditions under which nationally produced goods and services compete in the international marketplace 16 and thus serves as a goal that is generally subscribed to.
1T
Finally, the concept of states' international liability must be deemed central to any marine pollution regime in a more funda-12 This is true despite periodically occurring anachronistic attempts at reinstituting social decision-making through more or less unbridled market forces. For one such recent attempt, see statement of the U.S. delegation to the Nairobi Conference on the Human Environment: "U.S. Tells Ecology Parley to Trust Free Enterprise," N.Y. Times, May 12, 1982, at 8, col. i. 13 For details, see text infra at nn. 59-60.
14 Supra note 7, at 522. 15 Ibid. 16 Only knowledge of the certainty of having to bear the costs of transnational pollution will force states into making a proper cost-benefit analysis of transnationally polluting national activities and thereby will ensure that overall marginal activities will be terminated rather than carried on at the cost of the international community at large. 17 As to the "Polluter-Pays Principle," see Recomm. of the Council on the Implementation of the Polluter-Pays Principle, OECD Doc. C (74) 223, text in 14 Int'l Leg. Mat. 234 (1975) 18 To the extent that clarity of the latter is desirable, the notion of states' international accountability itself will have to be elucidated.
On the basis of these preliminary considerations, it should be evident that an inquiry into the notion of state liability for marine pollution is worthwhile and indeed necessary. The ever expanding scope of coastal state jurisdiction and its implication for increasing international conflict over marine pollution 19 makes this analysis particularly advisable. Its purpose here, however, will be a limited one. There will be no discussion of the procedural aspects of states' international accountability; 20 nor of exactly how state liability interfaces with a regime that channels liability to the private actor. For, while it is readily admitted that the "private law" approach is eminently reasonable, there is no need to re-examine issues that have already been discussed elsewhere. 21 Rather, the purpose of this article is to delineate the controlling state's basic accountability under international law, with the main focus on situations of accidental transnational pollution. For it is only upon a clear understanding of the central role that the concept of state liability invariably plays in any system of transnational accident law, that a regime that would be optimal in terms both of prevention of and compensation for transnational marine pollution damage can be devised. 18 Brownlie, "Causes of Action in the Law of Nations," 50 Brit. Y.B. Int 'l L. 13, at 40 (1979) : "A major role of State responsibility and the law of claims is psychological and moral: that of putting a hard edge on legal rights and duties."
19 In other words, the potential realm of an actio popularis would be correspondingly reduced. For a pertinent overview of the feasibility of an actio popularis for the protection of the environment beyond national jurisdiction, see, e.g., Picone, "Obblighi reciproci ed obblighi erga omnes deglistati nelcampo della protezione internazionale dell'ambiente marina dall'inguinamento," in Diritto Internazionale e Protezione dell 'Ambiente Macino 87-93 (V. Stargce, ed., 1983 There is no need here to dwell at length on the issue of state liability for non-accidental marine pollution. 22 Any intentional discharge of pollutants into the marine environment, provided it is not already regulated by specific conduct-related norms, 23 is subject to the requirement that the polluting activity not interfere significantly with other states' use of the seas. This fundamental limitation applies to state activities not only on the high seas but also in the territorial sea and the exclusive economic zone. On the one hand, it is the outflow of the principles of the freedom of the high seas and, on the other, the internationally non-injurious use by a state of territory or resources under its jurisdiction or control. 33 does not suggest that states fail to recognize a duty to prevent significant marine pollution under a prior duty of customary international law. Rather it testifies to the wellappreciated need to flesh out and expand upon the fundamental customary obligation with a view to rendering it more readily effective. This progressive legislative mapping of international obligations, however, has not always brought about the requisite specificity concerning the crucial "point of intersection of harm and wrong."
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In general, the limits of a state's responsibility for the preservation of the marine environment tend to remain ambiguous because of overly broad or imprecise formulations used in the conventions concerned. 35 Thus, the establishment of liability upon the proof of conduct contrary to a treaty obligation often remains an arduous task. In the absence of clear indicia, in the form of specific conductrelated provisions, the ascertainment of liability may still necessitate an ex post facto assessment of the international wrongfulness vel non of given state conduct. In such a contextual examination, 36 165-66 (1980) . Exceptionally, with the addition of technical annexes and the proscription of certain classes of polluting activities, some conventions do provide clear normative guidance, at least as to some primary rules of state responsibility. 36 For further details on this multiple-factor, balancing of interests test, see, e.g., Handl, supra note 29, at 187-92. 37 For a discussion, see Handl, "Transnational Pollution and the Problem of Territorial Sovereignty," 69 Am, J. Int 'l L. 50, at 58-72 (1975 Mat. 676 (1982) . Differences of opinion exist as to how best to promote prevention. For reservations as to the desirability of a general shift towards conductrelated environmental standards, see, e.g., Cummins et al., "Oil Tanker Pollution Control: Design Criteria vs. Effective Liability Assessment," 7 J. Maritime L. and Comm. 169, at 171 (1975-76) . The authors point to the possibility that in certain circumstances preventive guidelines, in particular technology-oriented standards, may not be the least expensive pollution prevention strategy available. While this point is well taken, the suggested alternative, namely deterrence exclusively through an effective system of liability, as a general proposition, is an unpersuasive strategy in light of the notorious difficulties in internalizing the real costs of the injurious activity in any situation of pollution. Obviously, only a mix of preventive controls and deterrence measures is most likely to produce the best results in terms of minimizing the costs of pollution prevention and of pollution damage.
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The Canadian Yearbook of International Law 1983 liability for transnational damage not only may be easier to decide against the background of well-established international preventive obligations incumbent on the acting state, but also may not be reached altogether because of a successful resolution of the dispute at the preventive stage.
INTERNATIONAL LIABILITY FOR ACCIDENTAL MARINE POLLUTION
A much greater theoretical challenge is the question of when a state's international liability may be said to be engaged in consequence of an accidental pollution of the seas. Despite extensive discussion, this issue has remained a source of some confusion among international lawyers. Differences in terminology apart, one major reason for this state of affairs is the frequently encountered misconception of the scope of the primary rule of state responsibility embodied in Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration. Couched in wide terms, namely as the obligation to ensure that no extraterritorial environmental damage is caused, 44 this rule might be taken to imply that a state becomes internationally liable simply upon the occurrence of significant transnational pollution damage. A more careful analysis, however, makes it evident that, as a general proposition, the notion of state liability based on pure causality is without foundation in present international law.
45
Not only do the records of the Stockholm Conference fail to provide support for such a view, but also international practice, both prior and subsequent to the adoption of the Declaration, clearly proves the contrary.
46 A state's international liability for accidental transnational pollution damage in general continues to be contingent upon the act of the state causing the damage being wrongful under international law. To be sure, any inquiry into whether a state might be internationally liable for accidental pollution will first focus on the transnational effects. An affirmative finding as to their "significance" will warrant the conclusion that an infringement of another state's right is involved. But contrary to cases of non-accidental pollution where such a finding will coincide with a finding of liability for the injury caused, a state's liability for accidental damage will, as a general rule, turn on an additional element. Liability will depend on proof that the state's lack of due care or due diligence brought about the transnationally injurious event.
In other words, the state's failure to prevent the injury will be evaluated against a standard of conduct which, in the light of the circumstances, the state could reasonably have been expected to adopt. sence of this criticism is that the emphasis on "due diligence" as the yardstick for determining liability runs counter to the result-oriented approach reflected inter alia in such international decisions as the Corfu Channel case. A state's international liability, it is argued, is being determined through the examination of the alleged violation of another state's right and not through inquiry into the reasonableness of the acting state's conduct.
49
But this argument is untenable in light of the very legal precedents which are being adduced in its support. Take, for example, the Corfu Channel case. In that decision, the Court upon establishing Albania's obligation to avert harm by verifying that Albania had knowledge of the existence of the minefield and of the approaching British convoy inquired specifically into whether Albania had also been capable of discharging this obligation. It thereby indicated that Albania's failure to utilize the existing opportunity to do so was the liability-determining element.
50 Thus, the decision reflects a standard of liability for negligence and clearly rejects the thesis that mere accidental invasion of another state's rights would automatically render the acting state liable. 51 However, it should be emphasized that the decision equally clearly rejects the idea that state liability presupposes "culpa" on the part of the individual whose conduct is imputed to the state. Non-negligent accidental losses pose a particular problem in any system of loss allocation in which "fault" traditionally is a key allocative criterion. The international legal system is no exception in this respect. That transnational loss caused by innocent state conduct should be left to lie with the equally innocent victim state has struck many as an untenable legal principle. 54 And it is certainly true that the law is not indifferent to the occurrence of substantial harm to the rights of others even though the injurious conduct may be blameless.
55 But acknowledging this fact is one thing; suggesting that accidental transnational losses as a class be shifted as a matter of law to the acting state irrespective of the latter's blameworthiness is quite another. While in many cases sound policy reasons may call for such a shift, in some situations it may be without intrinsic merit and possibly even offend fundamental tenets of fairness.
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The question thus raised is: in which circumstances and upon what basis will accidental transnational loss be reallocated to the innocent state in whose territory or under whose jurisdiction the event causing the injury originated? The answer can be stated unambiguously : where a recognizably significant transnational risk is (vol. II) The proposition that strict liability depends on a state's knowledge or presumed knowledge of the transnational risk it is creating, can be justified by reference to those goals that, it is generally agreed, inspire any system of accident law, namely the minimization of the costs of accidents (the efficiency criterion) and the idea of justice or fairness.
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The former objective would be served by shifting the loss to the innocent acting state which, in view of its knowledge (or presumed knowledge) of the hazard created, must be deemed to be the "better cost-avoider"; 5S the acting state is considered to be in a better position to decide whether or not the benefits of the activity are likely to outweigh its potential costs. ao To the extent, then, that the acting state could expect to have to shoulder the burden of the accidental transnational loss under a system of strict liability, marginally useful hazardous activities might not be carried on at all, while the carrying on of others is likely to be subjected to more elaborate safety measures. In short, the prospect of strict liability may provide a powerful incentive for the prevention of accidents. Similarly, from a compensation viewpoint, the acting state's more intimate knowledge of the risk involved 61 would generally make it easier for it to make advance arrangements in order to be able to meet adequately the potential transnational liabilities. 57 For a full development of the argument, see instead G. Handl, Transnational Risk-Creation and International Law (forthcoming obligations of "prior information and consultation," the victim state would share in the knowledge of the risk created. But both quantity and quality of the information thus supplied must realistically be expected to be less than that which will be available to the acting state.
Finally, strict liability can be defended also on the grounds of fairness. The acting state's conduct while bestowing benefits on the national community carries substantial potential penalties for the risk-exposed foreign nations. The state's duty to render compensation in the event that the risk should materialize consequently presents itself as a precondition for the international acceptability of such state conduct. The duty to redress any harm typical of the risk created thus flows from that balance of international rights and obligations embodied in the fundamental notion of the sovereign equality of states the potential disturbance of which the acting state was willing to countenance.
The critical element on which a state's strict international liability may be said to turn is, it should be reiterated, the creation of a recognizably significant transnational risk. When risk is properly understood to be the product of probability of an injurious event and the consequences of this event, the latter present themselves as the key ingredient of the notion of "significant risk." For a strict liability regime for transnational accidents is plausible only when the magnitude of potential damage associated with a given accident renders the risk-bearing activity a matter of international concern.
62
It is, in other words, the threat of exceptionally grave consequences coupled with a low probability of their happening, and not, vice versa, a high probability coupled with projected minor consequences, that renders a risk "significant" for the purposes of the present discussion.
63
That current international law affords a basis for shifting nonnegligent accidental losses arising from such significantly hazardous activities cannot be denied. Various treaty regimes already provide 62 In this regard see Jenks, "Liability for Ultra-Hazardous Activities in International Law," 117 Recueil des Gours 99, at 107 (1966) : "It does not imply that the activity is ultra-hazardous in the sense that there is a high degree of probability that the hazard will materialize, but rather that the consequences in the exceptional and perhaps quite improbable event of the hazard materializing may be so far-reaching that special rules concerning liability for such consequences are necessary if serious injuries and hardship are to be avoided."
63 If, by contrast, exceptionally severe consequences were to materialize on a continuous basis, i.e., the probability of their occurrence would be, mathematically speaking one, the accident-prone activity would be banned outright. Indeed, any unavoidably high probability of occurrence of a given accident would presumably render the risk-bearing activity unlawful as long as the consequences remained above the threshold of international legal significance. As to the latter, see text supra at n. 29.
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for strict or absolute liability for damage owing to accidents involving certain hazardous activities. 64 And there exists a fledgling extra-conventional state practice reflecting international acceptance of strict liability in cases of transnational damage owing to the miscarriage of recognizably dangerous activities. 65 For the moment, the evidence of state practice is insufficient to suggest a foundation in customary international law of a strict liability approach to transnationally hazardous activities in general. But the applicability of a strict liability principle to the above qualified transnational losses finds a different, broader justification. 66 To begin with, all major domestic legal systems in one way or the other provide for strict liability regimes for "sources of increased danger" or "abnormally dangerous activities."
67 Consequently, the notion that the creation of a transnational risk should entail a strict standard of international accountability in the event that typical harm materializes transnationally is expressive of a general principle of law. As such it must be considered a clear indication of universally shared expec- 68 Here, suffice it to say that the imposition of strict liability in the above circumstances is essential to secure a fair international distribution of costs and benefits of a given lawful state activity. It is a step that finds its ultimate justification in the sovereign equality of states and thereby is one whose legitimacy few commentators should seriously be willing to call into doubt. 68 In any event, as Dr. Jenks noted, "international law is not a limited body of specific rules, but a body of living principles and developing precedent growing with the needs of international society. Those who accept such a view of international law generally will find no difficulty in accepting the concept of a general liability in international law for ultra-hazardous activities." 70 68 The major issue, it will be recalled, is whether, in view of the existence of states with widely diverging socio-economic systems, "there can be normative principles common to socialist law and to bourgeois law": G. 
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Acceptance of such a principle of strict liability is increasingly in evidence. 71 The persuasiveness of a principle of this sort is also testified to by the insistence within the General Assembly on the elaboration by the International Law Commission of draft articles on international liability for injurious consequences arising out of acts not prohibited by international law;
72 by the strength of the feeling within the Commission itself that an engagement in a transnationally hazardous activity should entail the acting state's strict liability for loss or injury sustained; 73 and at least indirectly also by the Draft Convention of the Law of the Sea, which represents an undeniably significant touchstone for the specific issue here under discussion.
None of the pertinent provisions of the Convention appears, it is true, to envisage a state's strict liability for accidental damage to the marine environment. 7 * While it would surely be impossible to pass off strict liability as the general standard for marine pollution under the Convention, there is nothing in the evolution of the final text to suggest that strict liability might not play an exceptional role within the conventional framework. Paragraph i of Article 235 -the basic responsibility and liability article of the part specifically dealing with marine pollution -is rather illuminating in this respect: "States are responsible for the fulfilment of their international T1 Apart from the instances of international practice referred to (see supra note 21), acceptance of the principle is also finding increasing reflection in the literature. See, e.g., Kelson, supra note 67, at 243; Hardie, supra note 67, at 237; Cahier, "Le probleme de la responsabilit6 pour risque en droit international," obligations concerning the protection and preservation of the marine environment. They shall be liable in accordance with international law." The mere reference to "liability in accordance with international law," that is, avoidance of direct linkage of liability and violation of the obligations mentioned in the preceding sentence, contrasts sharply with an earlier version of the same article. Thus, Article 236, paragraph i, of the Informal Composite Negotiating Text had provided for states' liability "in accordance with international law for damage attributable to them resulting from violations of ... obligations [concerning the protection and preservation of the marine environment]."
75 Eventual restatement of this key liability provision in language that is neutral as regards the source of a state's international liability is highly significant, for it hints at a prevailing perception among the drafters of a need to accommodate as well those cases in which a state's international liability for marine pollution does not arise hi consequence of internationally wrongful conduct. Indeed, the change in the wording of what is now Article 235 was a compromise solution prompted by an amendment, proposed by Arab countries, 76 that would have provided for strict state liability in the event of damage to the marine environment. As to the fact that a state cannot be said to have automatically committed a violation of such an obligation upon the occurrence pure and simple of transnational environmental damage, see text supra at n. 51. In other words, the wording of Art. 236, para, i, must be deemed to be a reference to liability for harm resulting from internationally wrongful conduct. 76 As to the initial strict liability proposal by Morocco and Egypt, see statement of the Moroccan delegate at the 32nd meeting of the 3rd Committee, in UNCLOS- III, 6 Official Records 108, para. 21 (1977) . As to the change in response to the Arab countries' formula, see debates during the 4oth meeting of the 3rd Committee, UNCLOS-III, 11 Official Records, 69-73 (1979) . 77 See Informal Suggestion by Bahrain, Democratic Yemen, Egypt, etc., Doc.
MP/i8, in UNCLOS- III, 10 Official Records 111-12 (1978) . While the proposal stipulated the state's strict accountability, claims for compensation were to be handled in accordance with international or private law depending on whether acta iure imperil or gestionis were involved. As to the basic point of departure being strict state liability, see also statement of the Turkish delegate supporting the Arab countries' proposal: 3ist meeting of the 3rd Comm., in UNCLOS-III, 9 Official Records 160, para. 30 (1978).
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If, against this background, 78 it is obvious that special allowance was made at the Conference on the Law of the Sea for applicability of the principle of strict liability, it follows by necessary implication that nothing in the Draft Convention can be taken to militate against the invocation of that concept as a general principle of law.
A state's international liability in general, then, can be said to be engaged even in the absence of wrongfulness of its conduct, provided that the accidental damage to the transnational marine environment is (i) the result of a realization of a recognizably significant risk of harm, and (2) typical of the risk that the state created in its territory or under its jurisdiction. Risks falling into this category would seem to include but not be limited to those for which the so-called "private law liability conventions" establish a strict liability regime. For, if there is an evidently growing international consensus to hold the private actor strictly liable in the context of such activities as the bulk carriage by sea of oil, 79 offshore drilling operations, 80 the sea transportation of nuclear 81 as well as other hazardous and noxious materials, 82 and the operation of coastal or offshore nuclear power plants, 83 it would be difficult to maintain that states might not be held internationally to an equally strict standard of accountability.
84 After all, the policy reasons for imposing strict 78 Note in this context also the disclaimer made in Art. 304 of the "general provisions" clause: "The provisions of this Convention regarding responsibility and liability for damage are without prejudice to the application of existing rules and the development of further rules regarding responsibility and liability under international law. The question thus left to be answered is whether in circumstances other than the ones previously identified non-negligent accidental transnational maritime pollution might not require compensation as a matter of law. The conduct-oriented process of establishing liability, that is the exclusive emphasis on the notion of "special danger" as the vehicle for shifting loss from the victim has not gone unchallenged. There are those like Professor Cahier who take what merely looks like a result-oriented approach to the issue of loss allocation. By noting that any accidental occurrence of "dommage d'une gravite telle qu'il depasse les frontieres d'un Etat est la preuve meme d'un risque exceptionnel," Cahier makes transnational riskcreation the decisive criterion after all. 85 In other words, knowledge of the risk and willingness to expose other states to it are implicitly in issue because it is on the basis of these factors and intrinsically related policy considerations, such as prevention and reparation, that the loss will be shifted.
A truly different approach, however, has been taken by Professor Quentin-Baxter, the International Law Commission's Special Rapporteur on "international liability for injurious consequences arising out of acts not prohibited by international law." Particularly his second and third reports on the topic 86 present a challenging invitation to rethink the fundamental premises for loss allocation in the or not a so-called private law liability convention might apply. For none of these conventions address the issue of the international liability of the state, in this case the actor/operator. Some expressly deny pre-emption of the public international law avenue for compensation. As to the latter, see, e.g., Annex II to the 1960 Paris Nuclear Liability Convention, and Art. XVIII of the 1963 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, supra note 64.
As to the related but separate scenario where the controlling or authorizing state's liability for the miscarriage of an abnormally dangerous activity carried on by private persons may be in issue internationally, see text infra at nn. 100-9. 85 The Canadian Yearbook of International Law 1983 international legal system. After some apparent initial hesitation, 87 he now fully acknowledges the intrinsic merits of the notion of "special danger" as a loss shifting device in situations in which the acting state's conduct is free of blame.
88 He thus gives recognition to the key role of foreseeability of harm typical of a given activity, 89 not in the sense that it be occasioned as a consequence of a particular way in which the activity is carried on, but as a statistical probability, albeit a very low one,™ which reasonable care cannot eliminate. The imposition of strict liability in such a case is, as noted, the outcome, inter alia, of the judgment that the fair balance of rights and obligations among states is being disturbed and must be re-established. This balancing of interests test, eminently useful as it is in the context of discussing the basis of liability for statistically foreseeable transnational harm associated with a given state activity, is now being extended to provide the only rationale for loss shifting in those cases hi which the transnational injury was truly unforeseeable. In the final analysis, Quentin-Baxter argues, "when a loss or injury has occurred that nobody foresaw . . . there is a commitment, in the nature of strict liability, to make good the loss."
sl For, as he contends, in "these 'hard luck' cases . . . which fall outside the sphere of foreseeability" it would be neither just nor necessary to let the loss lie where it fell.
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Extension of the balancing of interests test to unforeseeable accidents for the purpose of inquiry into whether or not the acting state should be considered liable is unobjectionable. Non-foreseeability of the occurrence of transnational harm indeed cannot be an automatic bar to recovery by the victim state. But using the test in the sense of a mere reference to the underlying objective of an equitable 87 To this effect, see, e.g., Second Report, Add. i, supra note 34, 7, fn 86. 88 See Third Report, supra note 38, 11-12, para. 20-21. 89 See, e.g., ibid., 13, para. 23. Note in this context that "foreseeability" relates to "typicality of harm" rather than to the causal chain. In the end, strict liability simply would be contingent upon the occurrence of unforeseeable transnational injury. If in some sections of his report the rapporteur appears to come close to espousing such a radical viewpoint, 63 it is one that must not escape close scrutiny. It is difficult to see how in every instance of transnational injury that could not possibly have been foreseen even as a remote statistical probability justice and expediency would be served by shifting a loss to the innocent state whose implication in the occurrence of the accident might be extremely tenuous. For example, where extraordinary natural phenomena accounted for an unforeseeable causal connection between a state's activity and the occurrence of transnational harm that is atypical of any of the risks that could reasonably have been identified as being associated with the activity, shifting the loss does not make any sense from the point of view of prevention; and, as regards reparation, there is no inherent value in reallocating the loss, as lack of foresight will not have allowed the "acting state" to anticipate the occurrence of this sort of transnational liability. Moreover, given the attenuated causal relationship, the persuasiveness of shifting loss as being consonant with an equitable distribution of loss and benefits is, relative to situations where loss is statistically foreseeable, reduced rather than enhanced as Quentin-Baxter suggests.
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If in such a situation the victim state, say a developed country, were in a better position to assume the loss than the acting state, a developing country, neither fairness nor expediency would seem to dictate a shifting of loss. It should be evident, then, that unforeseeable transnational damage to the marine environment cannot be claimed to engage the acting state's liability as a matter of law simply upon its occurrence. 93 In fairness it has to be pointed out that while the preceding quotations do support this inference, the schematic outline appended to the 
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Indeed, there is no evidence of any, even incipient, state practice of this sort. 95 Neither is there a domestic analogy that would lend support to such a radical proposition. Whether liability would be incurred would depend principally on the outcome of negotiations among the parties. Liability might consequently be established on an ex post facto basis by determining that in the circumstances of the case under examination the loss concerned amounted to a disturbance of the fair balance of interests among the states involved. By contrast, recognizably transnationally hazardous activities are a priori and in the abstract found to be a threat to that balance and consequently will subject the acting state to strict liability upon the occurrence of harm typical of the risk created. While in the former situation the occurrence of damage, it is probably correct to say, 96 will merely activate a legal duty for the acting state to enter into negotiations with a view to readjusting the loss inflicted, in the latter situation it will trigger a non-negotiable international obligation to redress the injury caused.
INTERNATIONAL LIABILITY FOR MARINE POLLUTION FROM ACTS OF PRIVATE PERSONS
Today it must be considered a truism 97 that states in general are not liable for the transnationally injurious conduct of private individuals.
ss Thus, perhaps in a majority of cases of transnational pollution damage resulting from activities undertaken by such persons, a state's liability will, as noted before, be engaged only to the extent 95 In all those cases in which compensation payments were made upon the occurrence of transnational accidental damage despite the absence of allegations that the causal state conduct had been wrongful, the harm sustained was typical of the risk created, i.e., was " 100 of the risk-bearing private activity. This point of view is being argued forcefully by an increasing number of students of the issue. 101 Elsewhere it has been established at some length that there exist significant international legal indicia pointing to direct state liability for the miscarriage of transnationally hazardous private activities. 102 For this reason it suffices here merely to summarize the reasons in favour of the strict liability of the controlling or authorizing state. First, states must be deemed directly implicated in the realization of a transnational risk as private control over the recognizably hazardous activity concerned is or at least should have been subordinated to the state's authorization or supervision. Second, from the viewpoint of compensation a state's international accountability makes sense in view of the possibility that the private actor's assets or other potentially available financial resources might not be sufficient to defray the full costs of the degradation of the trans-A more pertinent objection could be grounded in the fact that in certain circumstances the element of control or of authorization may be so attenuated as no longer to provide a reasonable basis for holding the state internationally liable. In other words, there are situations in which neither of the principal policy objectives of prevention and reparation might be served by imposing strict liability on the state. This would be the case, for example, where owing to circumstances beyond its control the state exercises merely nominal control over the activity. Similarly, holding the state strictly accountable under international law would be without merit where initial state authorization of the activity must be deemed unrelated to the eventual risk created by the private actor and the state could not have reasonably been expected to extend its control in the face of subsequent risk creation.
Of the many variations on that theme, 1M> it is flag state liability for vessel-source pollution which is of particular interest here.
111 A state's direct implication in the occurrence of transnational loss is apparent in the event of accidental marine pollution from hazardous land-based sources or from dangerous offshore operations; states are presumed to exercise control over private activities within their territory or their offshore areas. By contrast, vessels, because of their Work of Its Twenty-Seventh Sess. [1975] YB ILC (vol. 2) 73, para. 12; cf. also Quentin-Baxter, Second Report, supra note 34, at 11, para. 19. Sir Ian Sinclair did raise the question of attributability in the ILG's debates on Quentin-Baxter's Third Report: U.N. Doc. A/CN-4/SR. I742, 6 (1982) . However, the issue seems to have been referred to in the context of situations in which state control over the hazardous private conduct was substantially attenuated. For a discussion of this special set of circumstances, see text infra at nn. 112-28. 110 Apart from situations of concurrent jurisdiction in general, a particularly interesting case is that of a high-technology exporting country and the importing developing country. To what extent, if any, should the exporting country be considered to exert "control" or "partial control" over the complex and hazardous technology for the purposes of determining co-liability in the event of an accident? For an indication of the importance of this issue, see, e.g., Quentin-Baxter, Third Report, supra note 38, at 20, para. to which the freighter is being put was not specifically envisaged by the flag-state authorities at the time of registration. Nor can it be maintained that the state authorities had control over the freighter's subsequent utilization. Consequently, holding that state liable in the event of a spill of toxic chemicals would appear indefensible in the light of the previous policy considerations. 117 The other type of situation in which a flag-state's international liability might not be invokable is one in which the flag state merely exercises nominal control over the private hazardous shipping activity while another state exercises effective control in the sense that the latter bears directly on the occurrence of the injurious accident. ot to regulate internationally the responsibility deriving from the carriage of hazardous substances in packages would mean -on the one hand -to ignore that this type of carriage is nowadays prevailing and, on the other hand, to underrate the fact that the most dangerous situations are actually those connected with the carriage of harmful substances in packaged form." On the trade in hazardous and noxious substances in general, see IMCO Doc. LEG 47/3/6, 1-3 (1982) .
national accountability, perhaps on a basis subsidiary to that of the private operator's liability, 125 makes sense. The fundamental point of departure for the imposititon of strict liability for transnationally injurious consequences associated with hazardous activities is, after all, the state's "control" over the activity; it is this control which puts the state into the position of the "better accident cost-avoider."
There is continued and strong international support for flag-state enforcement jurisdiction with regard to design, construction, and equipment standards and the seaworthiness of the vessel in general. 126 Accordingly, flag-states must be deemed to continue to exercise this liability-determining control in many of the circumstances in which transnationally hazardous shipping activities of private persons might accidentally cause a significant pollution of the marine environment. Therefore, it would be difficult to justify singling out such vessel-source pollution as a special case in which the flagstate could incur liability only upon proof that it had broken an international obligation.
CONCLUSIONS
If the preceding analysis has shown that the issue of a state's international liability for marine pollution is of ever-decreasing importance in the context of non-accidental pollution cases, it should have repudiated equally clearly the thesis that the issue might be moot altogether. There is a discernible and justified need for clarity of the concept of a state's international liability for damage caused by accidental marine pollution. Transnationally risk-bearing activities are increasingly being carried on by private parties whose potential transnational liabilities are to an ever-growing extent regulated through specific private law conventions. Nevertheless, states continue to play a crucial role with regard to prevention of and compensation for accidental damage even within the framework of such conventions.
127
The state's international accountability can be summarized as follows : (i) in general, states will be liable internationally for acci- 
